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Aristotle’s Considered View of the Path to Knowledge 
 
 
Two apparent discrepancies mar Aristotle’s discussion of ‘the path to knowledge’—
i.e. the means by which one attains a complete and accurate grasp of a subject. First, while 
the account in the Posterior Analytics focuses on constructing the special kinds of syllogisms 
that qualify as demonstration, when we turn to Aristotle’s scientific treatises, fully worked-
out syllogisms are nowhere to be found.i Second, according to the Analytics, the path to 
knowledge begins from the perception of sensible particulars, advances through the 
formulation of universal concepts and principles, and ends in a grasp of the subject grounded 
in a knowledge of its ultimate or ‘un-middle’ principles. In Book I of the Physics, however, 
Aristotle speaks in just the opposite terms, describing the natural path toward knowledge as 
beginning from universals and advancing toward particulars.ii In what follows I argue that 
these inconsistencies in wording and practice reflect the existence of two distinct Aristotelian 
views of inquiry, one peculiar to the Posterior Analytics and the other put forward in the 
Physics and practiced in the Physics and in other treatises.iii Although the two views overlap 
to some degree (e.g. both regard a rudimentary understanding of the subject as an essential 
first stage), the view of the syllogism as the workhorse of scientific investigation and the 
related view of inquiry as a search for the ‘missing middle terms’ turn out to be ideas 
peculiar to the Analytics. Conversely, the techniques of analysis and differentiation 
highlighted in the Physics account receive only cursory attention in the Analytics. However, 
when we consider the character of Aristotle’s own inquiries, on both scientific and 
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philosophical topics, it becomes clear that it is the Physics rather than the Posterior Analytics 
that gives us Aristotle’s considered view the path to knowledge. 
 
I The Analytics Account of Inquiry 
 
In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle famously equated scientific knowledge (epistêmê) 
with demonstration (apodeixis), and defined the latter as a certain kind of syllogism: 
…the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better 
known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect to 
cause…Syllogism there may indeed be without these conditions, but such syllogisms, 
not being productive of scientific knowledge, will not be demonstration. (I, 2, 71b) 
As I understand them, the phrases ‘better known than’, ‘prior to the conclusion’, and ‘related 
as effect to cause’ all zero in on a single requirement:  in a scientific demonstration the 
premises must relate to the causes of things (e.g. the fact that the planets are near to us); 
while the conclusions must relate to their effects (the fact that the planets do not twinkle), 
rather than the other way around. The requirement that the premises of a demonstration be 
‘primary’ and ‘immediate’ means that we do not know a thing in a scientific way until we are 
in a position to trace it back to its ultimate ‘reason why’. In addition, for Aristotle, scientific 
explanations must: (1) take the form of universal generalizations rather than partial claims or 
statements about individuals (cf. Meta I, 2 and Apo I 24 and II 19); (2) assert necessary 
connections (Apo I 4, 73b 16ff.); and (3) and be organized around the first-figure syllogisms 
Medieval students of logic knew as ‘Barbara’ and ‘Celarent’ (Apo I, 14). To use one of 
Aristotle’s stock examples: we can explain, and thereby come to know in a scientific way, 
why equilateral triangles possess 180 internal degrees by utilizing our knowledge that all 
equilateral triangles are, of necessity, triangles and that all triangles, of necessity, possess 180 
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interior degrees. And since we succeed in explaining the connection between our subject and 
predicate terms by supplying the appropriate middle term—the M—scientific inquiry may 
also be described as ‘the search for the ‘middle’: 
We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking either whether there is a ‘middle’, 
or what the ‘middle’ is: for the ‘middle’ here is precisely the cause, and it is the cause 
we seek in all our inquiries. (Apo II 1, 90a)iv 
 
But while the process of acquiring knowledge centrally involves the construction of 
syllogisms that meet these formal requirements, this activity cannot go on for any length of 
time in an informational vacuum. In order for scientists (using the term ‘scientists’ in a way 
broad enough to include mathematicians, astronomers, biologists, as well as philosophers) to 
be able to construct their syllogisms, they must become aware of a sufficiently large number 
of subjects and attributes with which to create the premises of their demonstrations. And 
these items, so we are told at Apr I 30, 46a, they have to get from experience: 
The method is the same in all cases, in philosophy, and in any art or study. We must 
look for the attributes and the subjects of both our terms, and we must supply 
ourselves with as many of these as possible…consequently it is the business of 
experience to give the principles which belong to each subject. I mean for example 
that astronomical experience supplies the principles of astronomical science, for once 
the phenomena were adequately apprehended, the demonstrations of astronomy were 
discovered. Similarly with any other art or science. Consequently, if the attributes of 
the thing are apprehended, our business will be to exhibit readily the demonstrations. 
For if none of the true attributes of the thing had been omitted in the historical survey, 
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we should be able to discover the proof and demonstrate everything which admitted 
of proof, and to make that clear whose nature does not admit of proof.v  
 
The view of the sources and methods involved in the acquisition of scientific 
knowledge I have just sketched is not without its merits. As Jonathan Barnes notedvi, it is a 
pioneering expression of the view of science as an axiomatic system, i.e. as a body of 
knowledge organized around the basic principles common to all sciences (e.g. the Law of 
Non-contradiction), as well as the specific axioms, postulates, and definitions appropriate to 
a particular discipline. Minus the syllogisms, it is also much the same vision of knowledge 
Plato articulated in Republic VI, when he spoke of the level of thought at which reason 
‘moves on through forms to forms and ends with forms’ (511c). But Aristotle was able to 
explain, as Plato was not, how something so mutable and imperfect as sense perception can 
lead us to something so solid and reliable as knowledge: from many sensations of the same 
thing comes memory, and from many memories comes a single experience, and from many 
experiences arise the universal concepts and principlesvii that constitute ‘reasons why’, the 
knowledge of which constitutes a correct scientific understanding of a given subject. 
 
On the other hand, Aristotle’s account faces a number of well-known difficulties. It 
ignores all forms of argumentation other than those that make use of one or more of the four 
basic categorical propositions—i.e. All S is P, No S is P, Some S is P, and Some S is not P. 
Even preserving the inferences Aristotle believed to hold among these four propositions (as 
displayed in what was later known as the Square of Opposition) requires that we make a 
blanket assumption concerning the existential import of all the subject and predicate terms 
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that appear in our propositions; i.e. that we assume that the things designated by our S, M, 
and P terms actually exist. But neither in science nor in daily life do we always wish to 
commit ourselves to the existence of all the items we are discussing (consider, for example, 
the point of asserting that ‘all trespassers are subject to prosecution’). A syllogistic science, 
moreover, can handle only a small fraction of all the quantities the scientist will need to 
consider. An Aristotelian scientist can consider the consequences of all, some, or no S being 
P, but not the consequences of an S that weighs 6.5 grams, has an internal temperature of 100 
degrees centigrade, or travels at 344 meters per second. Aristotle speaks, moreover, as 
though all a scientist needs to do in order to explain some phenomenon is to gather up 
enough subject and predicate terms with which to construct one or more explanatory 
syllogisms. What we miss here is some acknowledgement of how difficult it may be to 
identify the causally relevant attribute; e.g. what triggers a particular cell to begin unbridled 
growth, or which specific atmospheric conditions spawn tornadoes. It is also disconcerting to 
see Aristotle, at some point in the 4th century BCE, speaking of the time at which ‘all the 
astronomical phenomena were adequately apprehended… and the demonstrations 
discovered.’ Finally, one must ask, whatever became of the Analytics’ vision of science on 
the axiomatic model? Why do we not find Aristotle assembling subjects and predicates and 
arranging them within the first-figure syllogism he identified as the workhorse of scientific 
inquiry and explanation? The answer to this question, I believe, lies in Book I of the 
Physics.viii 
 
II The Physics Account of Inquiry 
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Aristotle opens his account of ta phusika, ‘the things of nature’ with a description of 
what he calls ‘the natural path’ to knowledge: 
The natural path (pephuke…hê hodos) starts from the things that are better known and 
clearer to us (ek tôn gnôrimôterôn hêmin…saphesterôn) and proceeds towards those 
that are clearer and better known by nature (ta saphestera têi phusei kai gnôrimôtera), 
for ‘things known to us’ and ‘things known without qualification’ are not the same. 
(Physics I 1, 184a)  
A similar view, stated in terms of what is better known and prior rather than what is better 
known and clearer, appears at the outset of the Posterior Analytics (I 2, 72a):  
I call prior and better known in relation to us (pros hêmas men protera kai 
gnôrimôtera) what is nearer to perception (ta egguteron aisthêseôs), prior and better 
known simpliciter what is further away (haplôs de protera kai gnôrimôtera ta 
porrôteron). What is furthest away are the most universal things (ta katholou malista) 
and what is nearest are the particulars (ta kath’ hekasta); and these are opposite 
(antikeitai) to each other. (Apo I 2, 72a) 
Both of these ways of speaking of ‘what is better known’ square with the story we find at 
Posterior Analytics II 19 and in Metaphysics I: the path toward knowledge begins from our 
perception of the sensible particulars (ta kath’ hekasta) and advances toward the grasp of the 
universal (to katholou), i.e. the universal concepts and principles with which scientists 
construct their demonstrations: 
So out of sense perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently 
repeated memories of the same thing develops experience, for many memories 
constitute a single experience. And from experience, or ratherix from the whole 
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universal established within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single 
identity within them all—originate skill and scientific knowledge (archê technês kai 
epistêmê), skill in the sphere of coming to be and scientific knowledge in the sphere 
of being. (Apo II 19, 100a)x 
 
At this point, however, Aristotle proceeds to speak in precisely the opposite terms: 
that which lies nearer to sense perception is to katholou: ‘the universal’xi, and the natural path 
of inquiry is said to proceed from universals to the particulars: 
Now the things that are at first plain and clear to us are the rather confused masses (ta 
sungkechumena mallon), the elements and principles of which later become known 
by analysis (diairousi). Thus we must advance from the universals (ek tôn katholou) 
to the particulars (epi ta kath’ hekesta), for it is the whole (to holon) that is best 
known to sense perception and the universal is a kind of whole (to katholou holon ti 
esti), since it comprehends many things as parts. (A 1, 184a-b) 
This, it must be admitted, is not a crystal clear set of remarks. What, one must wonder, are 
the rather confused masses that are the wholes and universals; and what for that matter are 
the wholes and universals? What, moreover, are the elements and principles that are the 
particulars?  By way of explanation Aristotle compares the inquiry that begins from the 
universal with the way in which we give an account or definition of a single term: 
Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the account. A name, e.g. 
‘circle’ (ho kuklos) means vaguely a sort of whole, whereas its definition (horismos) 
analyzes it into its particulars (ta kath’ hekasta). (A 1, 184b) 
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This explanation is itself puzzling since one would normally expect a definition of ‘circle’ to 
analyze it in terms of its genus (‘plane figure’) and differentia (‘such that all points on its 
circumference are equidistant from a given point’), and these are not ‘particulars’ in any 
obvious sense. But, as W. D. Ross explains in his commentary:  
…ta kath hekasta seems to have here an unusual meaning; i.e. to mean the various 
senses of an ambiguous term. Though it is essentially the business of definition to 
state the logical elements of a complex term, incidentally in doing this it will 
distinguish the various meanings of the term if this happens to be ambiguous.xii 
And, in fact, the word kuklos is extremely well suited to make Aristotle’s point. The standard 
Greek lexicon lists its various senses as ‘ring’, ‘place of assembly’, ‘circle of people’, 
‘wheel’, ‘circular dance’, ‘round shield’, ‘vault of the sky’, ‘disc of the sun’, ‘wall around the 
city’, ‘eye ball’, ‘orbit of the sun’, and ‘revolution of the seasons’.xiii So if inquiry involves 
‘much the same’ sort of activity as the one we engage in when we set out the different 
definitions of a term then we should expect to engage in a process of analysis much like 
disambiguation, but focusing on the various elements, principles, and causes that constitute a 
thing’s nature rather than on the various senses of an expression. 
 
Aristotle next likens inquiry to the way in which a child ‘begins by calling all men 
fathers and all women mothers but later distinguishes each of these’ (A 1, 184b); i.e. at some 
point a child uses the terms ‘father’ and ‘mother’ in connection with men and women who 
are neither his father nor mother and only later learns the correct, more restricted scope of the 
terms.xiv The lesson, evidently, is that in all our inquiries we naturally begin with a somewhat 
vague understanding of some (complex) item and move toward knowing what it is by 
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analyzing into its component elements, principles, and causes. The end result is a clear sense 
of what a thing is, what different forms it may take, and how it differs from other things with 
which it might easily be confused or mistaken. We might characterize such a process of 
inquiry as ‘the pursuit of knowledge through analysis into constituent and defining elements, 
followed by differential description in the light of the results of that analysis’.  
 
We can get a clearer sense of the process Aristotle has in mind here by reviewing the 
account he proceeds to offer in the Physics. In Physics I he reviews the accounts given by 
earlier inquirers into nature, clarifying in the process the sense in which things can be said to 
be ‘one’, since ‘the most pertinent question with which to begin will be this: In what sense is 
it asserted that all things are one’ (I 2, 185a). He then distinguishes the different ways in 
which earlier thinkers had spoken of things either as one (e.g. either as one in substance, 
underlying substrate, quantity, or quality, and as either continuously or discontinuously one), 
or as more than one (e.g. as multiple elements or as contraries). In Physics I 7 he states his 
own view: 
We shall now give our own account, approaching the question first with reference to 
coming to be in the widest sense (peri pasês geneseôs): for we shall be following the 
natural order (kata phusin) if we speak first of common characteristics (ta koina), and 
then investigate the characteristics of special cases (ta peri hekaston idia). (189b) 
After distinguishing between the coming into being of a substance and mere qualitative 
coming into being, he identifies the three principles essential to both—the two contrary states 
present before and after the change, and a third thing, the substratum which persists 
throughout the process, explaining in passing how this tripartite framework avoids the 
 10 
difficulties that beset the views of Parmenides and other early thinkers who claimed it was 
impossible for anything to come to be from ‘what is not’.  Book II begins with an analysis of 
the concepts of nature, by nature, and according to nature, before turning to distinguish 
between the different ways in which we speak of the causes of physical change. ‘Chance’ and 
‘spontaneity’ require discussion in so far as they are counted among the causes of change, as 
do ‘necessity’ and things that act ‘for the sake of something’. Since ‘nature’ has been defined 
as ‘a principle of motion and change’ it is clear that we must distinguish among the kinds of 
motion and change, ‘…since there are as many types of motion or change as there are 
meanings of the word “is”’ (III 1, 201a). Later books of the Physics take up and resolve other 
issues related to motion—the nature of place, the void, and time, distinguishing along the 
way finite from infinite motion, and continuous from discontinuous motion. An apt subtitle 
for the work might be: ‘ta phusika: an analysis of the ways in which we speak and think 
about the things that come into being, move about, and change, informed by a review of the 
opinions of earlier thinkers, with specific attention paid to the particular principles, elements, 
and causes that serve to distinguish the different kinds of coming into being, movement, and 
change from each other.’ 
 
The account of the soul in the De Anima follows along the same lines. After reviewing 
earlier accounts which had plausibly associated the soul with the capacities for movement, 
sensation, and perception, and less plausibly with harmony and the idea of a self-moving 
number, Aristotle sets out his preferred definition of the soul using two of his favorite 
explanatory notions, potentiality and actuality: the soul is ‘the first actuality of a natural body 
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having life potentially in it’ (De Anima 412a-413a). In a passage strongly reminiscent of the 
methodological remarks in Book I of the Physics he explains that: 
Since what is clear and theoretically better known (to saphes kai kata ton logon 
gnôrimôteron) emerges from what is in itself obscure but more observable to us (ek tôn 
asaphôn kai phanerôterôn), we must reconsider our results from this [observational] 
point of view (413a).  
Since what is evident to us from observation is that the things believed to possess soul are 
living beings endowed with the capacity for, or ‘first actuality’ of, self-nutrition, sensation, 
thought, and movement, we must survey the ways in which these capacities are distributed 
among different kinds of animate beings. Giving an exact account, he explains, will require 
focusing on the souls of plants, animals, and human beings in particular (414b-415a). To put 
it very briefly, the remainder of the De Anima consists of a series of accounts of the 
identifiable ‘first actualities’ or organized capacities of nutrition, sensation, thought, and 
movement, with each of these analyzed into their constitutive elements. In the discussion of 
sensation, for example, Aristotle examines the different sense faculties, the objects peculiar 
to each, and ‘the common sensibles’ [things perceived by more than one sense], with the 
general finding that in each case sensation involves reception within the sense organ of the 
sensible form without the matter. An apt subtitle for the work might be; ‘peri psuchês: an 
analysis of the ways in which we speak and think about living creatures, informed by a 
review of the opinions expressed by earlier thinkers, with specific attention paid to the 
principles, elements, or causes that serve to distinguish the different psychic capacities from 
each other.’  
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When we turn to the biological treatises we find less attention devoted to ‘the ways in 
which we speak and think about things’ and more to the internal and external organs, 
faculties, modes of reproduction, courses of development, and ways of life that serve to 
distinguish different species of animals from one another. While the Historia Animalium 
focuses on identifying the parts possessed by different kinds of animals, the Parts of Animals 
undertakes to explain why animals have the particular parts they do. But in both accounts 
there is a general movement from generalities to specifics, from wholes to parts.  In Book I 
of the Historia Animalium, after providing a lengthy survey of various ways in which 
animals differ from one another (e.g. some animals produce live offspring while others lay 
eggs), Aristotle comments: 
These preceding statements have been put forward as a kind of foretaste of the 
number of subjects and of the properties that we have to consider in order that we 
may first get a clear notion of their actual differences and common properties, By and 
by we shall discuss these matters with greater precision. (HA I 6, 490b) 
At the outset of the Parts of Animals he similarly states: 
…the true method is to state what the definitive characters are that distinguish the 
animal as a whole; to explain what it is both in substance and form, and to deal after 
the same fashion with its several organs; in fact to proceed in exactly the same way as 
we should do if we were giving a complete description of a couch. (PA I 1, 641a) 
The two biological inquiries have different objectives in view—detailed description of parts 
in the first case, and development of causal explanations in the second—but both illustrate 
the general method of analysis and differential description set out in Physics I. Without 
passing judgment on the merits of each of these individual accounts, it seems clear that this 
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set of techniques enabled Aristotle to develop a set of detailed and attractive accounts on a 
wide range of topics. 
 
III One Account or Two? 
We have seen how in the Prior and Posterior Analytics Aristotle held that we come to 
have knowledge of a subject in an unqualified way when we able to establish that all S is 
necessarily P on the basis of our knowledge that all S is necessarily M and all M is 
necessarily P. In all our inquiries, so we are told, it is the task of experience to supply us with 
the middle terms that enable us to link subjects with their predicates, and it is our task to 
move toward a more adequate grasp of essential natures by packing in more and more 
‘middles’ until we reach the ultimate or ‘un-middled’ principles of explanation. We have also 
seen how, according to Posterior Analytics II 19, the path of inquiry begins from the 
perception of sensible particulars and ends in the grasp of universal concepts and principles. 
In the Physics, however, Aristotle states that the natural path to knowledge starts from a 
somewhat confused awareness of some item and concludes with a precise understanding of 
its essential nature in the light of its particular principles, elements, and causes. How should 
we understand the relation between these two accounts? 
 
At Historia Animalium I 7 Aristotle links the analytic process described in the 
Physics with the construction of demonstrative syllogisms described in the Analytics by 
characterizing demonstration as a stage of inquiry that naturally follows upon the detailed 
analysis of wholes into parts: 
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After this [i.e. after identifying the parts of animals] we shall pass on to the discussion 
of causes. For to do this when the investigation of the details is complete is the 
natural method (kata phusin), for from them the subjects and the premises of our 
demonstration (peri hôn te gar kai ex hôn einai dei tên apodeixin) become clear. 
(Revised Oxford translation of 491a) 
Similarly, in De Anima I, 1, he describes inquiry as a process in which we first develop an 
account of a thing’s essential nature and then construct demonstrations that link up its 
characteristics with one another: 
…when we are able to give an account conformable to experience of all or most of 
the properties of a substance, we will be in a position to say the best things (legein 
kallista) about the essential nature of that subject; in all demonstration a definition of 
the essence is required as a starting point, so that definitions that do not enable us to 
discover the derived properties, or fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must 
obviously, one and all, be dialectical and futile. (402b) 
In short: once we have identified the attributes which constitute a thing’s essential nature, 
and made use of those attributes in order to formulate a definition of that nature, we can then 
demonstrate the necessary presence or absence of other attributes by reference to those in the 
initial set. To cite just one small example: once Aristotle has defined the ‘what-ness of the 
soul’ as ‘the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it’ (412a) he 
then comments on: 
…the rightness of the view that the soul cannot exist without a body, while it cannot 
be a body; it is not a body but something relative to a body. That is why it is in a body 
and a body of definite kind. (414a). 
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While he does not explicitly make this point in the form of a syllogism (e.g. that all souls 
must exist within a body since all souls are first actualities of a body, and all first actualities 
of a body must exist within a body), he does nevertheless supply an explanation for a 
derivative property in the light of an established definition of the soul’s nature. These two 
passages link up the account of inquiry given in the Physics with the one given in the 
Analytics in so far as they depict the process of analysis that leads to the formulation of a 
definition of essence as a stage preliminary to the construction of the special sorts of 
syllogisms that constitute demonstration.  
 
It is also possible to regard the process of moving from the particular to the universal 
described in the Analytics and the process of moving from the universal to the particular 
described in the Physics as stages within a single larger process. xv It is one thing, for 
example, for a child to become familiar through repeated experience with the phenomenon of 
thunder as something like ‘the loud noise in the sky’ (what both the Physics and Analytics 
speak of as grasping ‘the whole or entire universal’), and quite another for a scientist to 
achieve a detailed understanding of the phenomenon of thunder as, to put it in Aristotelian 
terms, ‘the noise produced in the heavens by the quenching of fire’. Once we realize that it is 
one thing to advance from sense perception to a rudimentary understanding of what a thing is 
and quite another to move from that rudimentary understanding to being able to define a 
thing’s essential nature in virtue of its constituent elements and causes, the apparent 
inconsistency between the two ways of speaking vanishes.xvi Thus, by drawing on comments 
made in different settings we can construct a single, logically consistent Aristotelian view of 
inquiry as a process comprising four distinct (though related) stages: (1) acquiring a 
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rudimentary conception of what a thing is as a consequence of repeated perception of 
individual instances (= ‘grasping the whole universal’); (2) developing a detailed 
understanding of what it is to be a thing of this sort through the identification of its specific 
principles, elements and causes; (3) formulating a definition of a thing’s essential nature in 
terms of the principles, elements, and causes just identified in stage (2); and (4) producing 
demonstrations (at least some of which might be put in syllogistic form) setting out the 
relationships that hold among the thing’s essential attributes, as well as the connections that 
hold between those attributes and others, based on the definition formulated in stage (3).  
 
This picture of inquiry, however, remains sharply at odds with two basic features of 
the Analytics account. Even though Aristotle is prepared to speak of demonstration in 
connection with a process of analysis and differentiation, it is clear that in these settings 
demonstration functions not as the framework for inquiry in its entirety, as the unqualified 
descriptions given in Analytics would lead one to suppose, but merely as its final, largely 
summative phase.xvii In addition, according to the Analytics, we advance toward complete 
mastery of a subject by identifying and inserting into our syllogisms a series of newly 
acquired middle terms. Nowhere in the Physics, De Anima, or any of the biological treatises, 
does Aristotle characterize the process of inquiry in such terms. Indeed, so far as I have been 
able to determine, outside the logical works there are only three occurrences of to meson in 
the sense of ‘the middle term of a syllogism’ in the entire Aristotelian corpus, and in none of 
those three passages is Aristotle discussing inquiry.xviii This striking pattern of distribution 
suggests that while Aristotle may have always had some role in mind for demonstration, it 
was only during the period when he was writing the Analytics that he conceived of inquiry as 
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a process in which we search for, find, and insert a series of middle terms into our 
syllogisms. While it is difficult to be sure about the course of his intellectual development, it 
seems plausible to suppose that at some point Aristotle began to move away from the 
syllogism-based understanding of the nature of inquiry set forth in the Analytics and toward 
the process of analysis and differentiation described in Physics I 1.xix Given the close 
correspondence between the Physics account and many of the inquiries Aristotle actually 
carried out, on both scientific and more broadly philosophical topics, it seems clear that it is 
the Physics, and not the Posterior Analytics, that presents us with Aristotle’s considered view 
of the path to knowledge.xx 
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FOOTNOTES 
i Hankinson (1995: 113) comments: ‘…one can trawl the whole of Aristotle’s considerable 
scientific oeuvre without netting a single instance of a fully worked-out 
syllogism…Aristotle’s commentators sometimes trouble to reformulate his arguments in 
syllogistic form—but Aristotle himself does not do so.’ 
ii Bolton (1991: 4) comments: ‘However, in the passage in the Analytics such items [i.e. what 
is most accessible to perception] are said to be most opposed to and furthest from what is 
katholou (i.e. universal). This flatly contradicts what is said in Phys. I.1 unless, as most 
commentators reasonably conclude, the use of the term katholou in Phys. I. 1 is peculiar…’ 
iii Although the question of chronology is not vital to my argument, I believe that Aristotle 
conceived the view of inquiry presented in the Analytics prior to conceiving the view 
presented in the Physics. Certainly the Analytics’ focus on knowledge as an axiomatic system 
is what one would expect to find in a work written early on in Aristotle’s career, with a Plato-
inspired regard for the importance of achieving a systematic understanding still part of his 
philosophical outlook. But the important point is to recognize the existence of contrasting 
views of inquiry, in whichever order they were conceived. For a set of informative if not 
decisive discussions of ‘the developmental question’ see Wians 1996. 
iv  Similarly, Apo I 6, 75a; I 8, 76a; I 11, 77a; and I 21, 82b. A somewhat different view is 
suggested by Apo. I, 12, 78a: ‘A science expands not by the interposition of fresh middle 
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terms, but by the apposition of fresh extreme terms’, but this may mean only that while a 
science is completed by the insertion of middle terms it is expanded or extended by means of 
additional extreme terms (see further Ross 1949: 550). 
v  This passage reveals Aristotle commitment to syllogism and demonstration in the context 
of the process of discovery, thereby providing reason to reject the view held by G. E. L. 
Owen that the theory of the syllogism ‘plays small part in his scientific and philosophical 
inquiries just because it is not a model for inquiry but for subsequent exposition of the results 
of inquiry’ (Owen 1975: 27), as well as the thesis defended by Jonathan Barnes that ‘the 
theory was never meant to guide or formalize scientific research; it was concerned 
exclusively with the teaching of facts already won; it does not describe how scientists do, or 
ought to, acquire knowledge: it offers a formal model of how teachers should present and 
impart knowledge’ (Barnes 1975: 77).  For a detailed critique of Barnes’ thesis, see Wians 
1989. 
vi Barnes 1975: xiii. 
vii  My phrase ‘universal concepts and principles’ reflects one of the more salient difficulties 
in the discussion of the path from sensation to knowledge of first principles in Apo. II, 19. 
Aristotle there announces that he will explain how we come to know first principles and 
concludes that he has done so. But what he actually explains is only how we come to form 
universal concepts as a consequence of the repeated perception of sensible particulars. 
Perhaps the best way to handle this discrepancy is to believe that Aristotle thought that 
developing a (scientific) concept of X involved essentially the same set of activities as 
identifying the attributes that can be truly and universally ascribed to their subjects, hence 
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furnish the requisite universal principles. (A solution along these lines is suggested in Barnes 
1975: 259-260). 
viii Several attempts have been made to link the syllogism-based approach set out in the 
Analytics with Aristotle’s actual practice in his biological treatises (see the studies by Bolton 
1987, Lennox 1987, and Gotthelf 1987). While I accept the thesis that in these treatises 
Aristotle develops the ingredients with which syllogisms could be constructed, the fact 
remains that, so far as we can tell, he never actually constructs them. As I see it, the most 
plausible step to take in the light of this discrepancy between ‘Aristotle’s theory’ and his 
practice is to revisit the assumption that it is the account in the Analytics that represents 
Aristotle’s considered view of the nature of inquiry. 
ix My ‘or rather’ reading of Aristotle’s ê is justified by the distinction between ‘experience’ 
and the grasp of the universal that is characteristic of art and knowledge, as set out in 
Metaphysics I, 1. For one attempt to explain Aristotle’s epistemology without the ‘rather’, 
see the discussion in Turnbull 1976. 
x Similarly at Apo I 8, I 18, and I 31, scientific knowledge is said to consist in the grasp of the 
universal discovered by means of induction from the perception of sensible particulars. 
xi I translate katholou throughout as ‘universal’ in part because Aristotle here suggests that 
the universal is merely ‘a kind of whole’ (to de katholou holon ti esti) and not literally a 
whole. It must be admitted, however, that Aristotle speaks here in a decidedly unhelpful 
manner—using the same term to speak of a perceptible compound that he elsewhere uses to 
speak of an entity that can be present ‘in the soul’ (cf. Apo. II, 19, 100a16: proton men en têi 
psuchêi katholou). Perhaps the best explanation for this peculiar behavior is that Aristotle 
understood the root meaning of katholou as ‘that which is kath holou; i.e. ‘on the whole’, and 
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believed that there were various ways in which things could be spoken of as ‘on the whole’. 
Thus in a sense katholou means the same thing in Physics I, 1, as it does in Apo. II, 19; 
namely: ‘something on the whole’—either an observable whole, or an attribute that applies to 
an entire class of subjects. Wieland holds that ‘katholou here, of course, does note designate 
anything general in the sense of a class, but something general in the sense of indeterminate, 
something not yet differentiated into its factors’ (1975:131). But while it is true to say that 
the compound is about to be analyzed into its factors, it is not plausible to suppose that 
katholou here means ‘indeterminate’.  
xii Ross 1936: 457.  
xiii Liddell and Scott. 1976, s.v. kuklos.  
xiv As Konstan (1975: 242) explains, this does not mean that children unable to distinguish 
their fathers from other men, or their mothers from other women: ‘[Aristotle] says only that 
they do not know that fathers and mothers are something different from men and women 
generally’. 
xv I follow Reeve in crediting Aristotle with a distinction between the ‘first or whole 
universals’ and the ‘well-understood or analyzed universals’ (Reeve 2000: 18-20). I do not, 
however, agree with his view that the process by which the scientist comes to an 
understanding ‘is itself inductive’ (p. 20). That is indeed the story told in the Posterior 
Analytics II, 19, but not the one told in Physics I. 
xvi The account I present here represents one of several possible ways out reconciling these 
two ways of speaking of ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’. For other approaches, see Konstan, 
1975, Turnbull 1976, Bolton 1987, and Angioni 2001. Without passing judgment on the 
merits of each of these approaches, it is important to see that establishing the consistency of 
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the Physics and Analytics accounts on this point does not establish that Aristotle had a 
monolithic view of the nature of inquiry. Similarly Modrak1996 shows how on a number of 
specific points Aristotle’s practice as a scientific investigator is consistent with the general 
theory of knowledge he set out in the Posterior Analytics. But she does not discuss whether 
Aristotle remained committed to demonstration as the framework for scientific investigation 
in its entirety and to view of inquiry as the search for the missing middle term. In the light of 
these differences it does not appear to be correct to say that ‘all of Aristotle’s methodological 
discussions endorse the central tenets of the Analytics picture’ (p. 170). 
xvii Ferejohn 1991 argues that in the Analytics Aristotle conceives of inquiry as admitting of 
at least two stages—an initial ‘framing’, definitional stage and syllogism proper. This seems 
correct, but various remarks Aristotle makes in the Analytics make it clear that he sees 
demonstration as the main task of the investigator, with definition playing an ancillary role 
(see the somewhat labored discussion of definition and its relation to demonstration in Apo. 
II, 3-10).  
xviii De Anima I 3, 407a29, Metaphysics V 3, 1014b2, and Nicomachean Ethics VI 9, 
1142b24. For a full listing see Bonitz 1870: 456-457, s.v. mesos. Forms of mesos occur often 
in various settings (e.g. in the doctrine of the mean). To meson occurs twelve times in the 
Physics, but it there designates the mid-point of a movement or period of time (219a, 227a, 
229b, 245a, 245b, 251b, 262a, and 264b). Similarly, meson appears four times in the De 
Anima but in connection with the view of sense perception as a mean between opposite 
qualities (423b, 424a) and with a line that is a mean between two unequal sides of a triangle 
(413a). 
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xix Otherwise we must conclude either that Aristotle simultaneously held two inconsistent 
views of the nature of inquiry or that he first developed a powerful set of analytic techniques 
and then abandoned them in favor of a syllogism-based approach to inquiry—which he never 
fully put into practice. 
xx  I am grateful to Larry Jost, Michael, Ferejohn, and Rachel Singpurwalla for their helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful for comments made 
following a presentation of a draft version to the students and faculty in the Department of 
Philosophy at George Mason University in March of 2007. 
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